SG-H-CS-31 | Koh Beng Seng — The Regulator Who Reshaped Singapore's Banks

Document Code: SG-H-CS-31 Full Title: Koh Beng Seng — The Regulator Who Reshaped Singapore's Banks Coverage Period: 1950s–2000s Level Designation: Level 3 Profile Primary Sources Consulted:

1. Monetary Authority of Singapore, annual reports and policy statements (1985–2000)
2. The Straits Times and The Business Times, coverage of banking sector reforms, 1997–2002
3. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000 (Singapore: Times Editions, 2000)
4. W. Nair, various writings on Singapore's banking sector evolution
5. Parliament of Singapore, Hansard, debates on banking policy and MAS regulation, various dates
6. DBS Bank, corporate histories and annual reports (various years)
7. POSB, institutional histories (pre-merger records)
8. International Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment Program reports on Singapore (various years)

Related Documents:

• SG-I-02 | The Monetary Authority of Singapore — institutional history
• SG-H-DPM-01 | Goh Keng Swee — founder of MAS
• SG-C-08 | The Asian Financial Crisis and Singapore's Response (1997–1999)
• SG-E-03 | The DBS Story — from development bank to regional financial institution
• SG-H-CS-14 | Ngiam Tong Dow — comparative figure in economic policy

Version Date: 2026-03-09

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Section 1: Key Takeaways

• Koh Beng Seng was the Monetary Authority of Singapore's most powerful and most controversial banking supervisor — the official who, from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, exercised near-absolute authority over Singapore's banking sector and whose decisions shaped the structure of the financial industry that exists today.

• His most consequential act was the orchestration of the 1998–1999 banking consolidation — the government-directed merger and restructuring of Singapore's local banks in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. This consolidation, which included the landmark merger of DBS Bank and the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), reduced the number of local banking groups and created institutions that were large enough to compete regionally.

• Koh operated with a combination of regulatory authority, personal force, and political backing that made him, in practice, the single most powerful figure in Singapore's financial sector. Bankers described him variously as brilliant, intimidating, imperious, and indispensable. His regulatory style was characterised by detailed personal involvement in individual bank decisions, a willingness to override bank management when he judged it necessary, and an expectation of complete compliance with his directives.

• The DBS-POSB merger of 1998 was the defining transaction of the consolidation programme. POSB — the Post Office Savings Bank — was Singapore's largest retail deposit-taker, with a network that gave it access to the savings of ordinary Singaporeans. Its absorption into DBS transformed DBS from a wholesale-oriented development bank into a full-service institution with a massive retail base, creating the foundation for DBS's subsequent growth into Southeast Asia's largest bank.

• Koh's approach to banking supervision was paternalistic in the deepest sense. He believed that Singapore's banks needed to be protected from their own management's weaknesses — their excessive conservatism, their resistance to change, their unwillingness to invest in technology and regional expansion. His role, as he saw it, was not merely to ensure prudential standards but to drive strategic transformation.

• His departure from MAS in 1999 was abrupt and largely unexplained — a quiet exit that generated speculation but no definitive public accounting. The circumstances of his leaving remain one of the more intriguing mysteries of Singapore's financial regulatory history.

• The banking sector that Koh left behind was structurally different from the one he had supervised. The consolidation had created larger, stronger, more regionally oriented banks. But the process by which that consolidation was achieved — top-down direction by a regulator who brooked no dissent — raised questions about the appropriate boundary between regulatory supervision and regulatory interference in a market economy.

• Koh's career illustrated a distinctive feature of Singapore's governance: the willingness to concentrate enormous power in the hands of capable individuals and to tolerate a degree of authoritarianism in pursuit of national strategic objectives. This approach delivered results — Singapore's banks emerged from the Asian Financial Crisis in better shape than those of its regional neighbours — but it also created risks of arbitrary decision-making, regulatory overreach, and the suppression of market signals that a more light-touch approach would have preserved.

• The debate over Koh's legacy is, at its core, a debate about the Singapore model itself: whether strong, directive government intervention in the economy produces better outcomes than market-based approaches, and whether the costs of such intervention — in terms of market distortion, institutional autonomy, and the stifling of private-sector initiative — are justified by the results.

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Section 2: The Record in Brief

Koh Beng Seng was, for approximately fifteen years, the most feared and most powerful financial regulator in Singapore. As the head of banking supervision at the Monetary Authority of Singapore from the mid-1980s until his departure in 1999, he exercised a degree of control over the banking sector that had no parallel in any other major financial centre. His authority derived not merely from his formal regulatory powers — which were extensive — but from a combination of personal intellect, political backing, and a willingness to use his authority to its fullest extent.

Koh's supervision of Singapore's banks was characterised by detailed, hands-on intervention in individual bank decisions. He did not confine himself to prudential oversight — ensuring that banks maintained adequate capital, managed their risks properly, and complied with regulatory standards. He also involved himself in strategic decisions — the direction of banks' business development, their expansion plans, their technology investments, and their leadership appointments. Bankers who dealt with Koh described an experience that was part regulatory examination, part strategic consultation, and part inquisition.

The defining event of Koh's career was the banking consolidation of 1998–1999. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998, which devastated the banking sectors of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, exposed the vulnerability of Singapore's relatively small local banks. While Singapore's banks were better capitalised and better managed than their regional counterparts, they were, in Koh's assessment, too small, too fragmented, and too domestically focused to compete in an increasingly integrated regional financial market.

Koh's solution was forced consolidation. Through a combination of regulatory pressure, government direction, and behind-the-scenes orchestration, the number of local banking groups was reduced. The most dramatic transaction was the merger of DBS Bank and POSB in 1998. POSB, which had been a statutory board — a government savings institution — was corporatised and merged into DBS, giving DBS access to POSB's enormous retail deposit base and transforming it into Singapore's dominant retail bank.

The consolidation was controversial. Some bankers and analysts argued that it was premature, that market forces would have driven consolidation in due course, and that forced mergers risked destroying value. Others argued that the crisis provided a window of opportunity for restructuring that would not have been available in normal times, and that Singapore's banks needed to be larger to compete regionally.

Koh's departure from MAS in 1999, shortly after the consolidation was largely complete, was quiet and unexplained. There was no public announcement, no farewell ceremony, no official explanation. He simply left. The circumstances generated speculation — was he pushed out? Did he resign? Was there a disagreement over policy or personality? — but the Singapore government's characteristic opacity on personnel matters meant that definitive answers were never provided.

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Section 3: Timeline of Key Events

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Section 4: Background and Context

The MAS and Banking Supervision

The Monetary Authority of Singapore, established in 1971 on Goh Keng Swee's initiative, was Singapore's central bank in all but name. It performed all the functions of a central bank — monetary policy, exchange rate management, banking supervision, and financial sector development — without being formally designated as one. The MAS was deliberately designed as a powerful institution, with broad regulatory authority and direct accountability to the government.

Within MAS, the banking supervision function was particularly important because of the strategic significance of Singapore's banking sector to the national economy. Singapore's ambition to become a major international financial centre required a banking sector that was sound, well-capitalised, and professionally managed. The regulator's job was to ensure these qualities while also fostering the growth and international competitiveness of the sector.

Singapore's Banking Landscape Before Consolidation

Before the 1998–1999 consolidation, Singapore's local banking sector consisted of several banking groups: DBS Bank (the Development Bank of Singapore, originally established as a government development bank), OCBC (the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation), UOB (United Overseas Bank), OUB (Overseas Union Bank), Tat Lee Bank, Keppel Bank, and several smaller institutions. Each of these banks had its own history, its own shareholder base, and its own market position.

By regional standards, Singapore's banks were well-managed and well-capitalised. They had avoided the reckless lending that had brought down banks in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. But by international standards, they were small. Even the largest — DBS — was modest in scale compared with the major banks of Japan, Europe, or the United States. And their domestic focus meant that they were not capturing the opportunities presented by the rapid economic growth of Southeast Asia and China.

The Asian Financial Crisis Context

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 was the catalytic event that triggered the consolidation. The crisis exposed the fragility of banking systems across the region: banks in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea collapsed under the weight of bad loans, excessive leverage, and inadequate supervision. Singapore's banks survived the crisis in relatively good shape, but the experience demonstrated the dangers of having a banking sector that was too small and too fragmented to absorb severe economic shocks.

The crisis also provided political cover for reforms that might have been impossible in normal times. The spectacle of banking collapses across the region made the argument for consolidation compelling: if Singapore's banks were going to be resilient, they needed to be larger, more diversified, and better capitalised. The crisis created the urgency that enabled the government and MAS to overcome the resistance of incumbent bank management and shareholders to restructuring.

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Section 5: The Primary Record

The Banking Supervisor

Koh's Regulatory Philosophy

Koh Beng Seng's approach to banking supervision departed significantly from the Anglo-American model of arm's-length regulation. In the Anglo-American tradition, the regulator's role was to set rules, monitor compliance, and intervene only when rules were violated or institutions were in distress. The regulator was an umpire, not a player.

Koh was a player. He involved himself in the strategic direction of the banks he supervised, offered (and sometimes imposed) views on business strategy, and used his regulatory authority as a lever to drive changes that he believed were in the national interest. His regulatory philosophy was closer to the Japanese model of administrative guidance — in which the regulator actively shaped the development of the financial sector through a combination of formal authority and informal influence — than to the hands-off approach favoured by Anglo-American regulators.

This approach was effective but controversial. It was effective because it ensured that Singapore's banks were conservatively managed, well-capitalised, and prudently supervised during a period when banks across the region were taking excessive risks. It was controversial because it concentrated enormous power in the hands of a single individual and because it blurred the boundary between regulation and management — between telling banks what they could not do and telling them what they should do.

The Personal Style

Koh was, by all accounts, formidable. Bank CEOs and board members who met with him described encounters that were intellectually rigorous, personally demanding, and sometimes bruising. Koh expected bank leaders to have a thorough command of their institutions' operations, finances, and risk profiles. He asked detailed questions, challenged assumptions, and was not shy about expressing displeasure when he found performance or preparation wanting.

His personal style contributed to an environment in which banks were acutely conscious of the regulator's expectations and generally reluctant to deviate from them. This created a conservative, well-managed banking sector — but it also suppressed the kind of entrepreneurial risk-taking that might have allowed Singapore's banks to innovate more aggressively.

The Banking Consolidation

The Strategic Logic

The consolidation programme rested on a straightforward strategic argument: Singapore's local banks were too small and too numerous. In an increasingly integrated regional financial market, banks needed scale to compete — scale in terms of capital base, branch network, technology investment, and product range. The fragmented structure of Singapore's banking sector — multiple small banks competing for the same domestic market — was a recipe for inefficiency and strategic irrelevance.

The solution was consolidation — reducing the number of banking groups through mergers and acquisitions to create a smaller number of larger, more competitive institutions. The goal was to produce banks that could compete not just domestically but regionally — institutions that could establish meaningful presences in the fast-growing markets of Southeast Asia and China.

The DBS-POSB Merger

The centrepiece of the consolidation was the merger of DBS Bank and POSB. This was not a market-driven transaction. POSB was a statutory board — a government institution — and its merger into DBS was a government decision, not a commercial negotiation. The government transferred POSB's assets, liabilities, and branch network to DBS in exchange for DBS shares, transforming DBS overnight from a wholesale-oriented development bank into Singapore's largest retail banking institution.

The strategic logic was compelling. DBS had corporate banking capabilities and regional ambitions but lacked a domestic retail base. POSB had the largest retail deposit base in Singapore — the savings of millions of ordinary Singaporeans — but lacked the corporate banking expertise and regional vision to deploy those deposits effectively. Combining the two created an institution that had both the funding base and the strategic capabilities to compete regionally.

The merger was also politically significant. POSB was an institution with enormous public trust — the savings bank where generations of Singaporean schoolchildren had opened their first accounts. Its absorption into DBS, a commercial bank, raised concerns about whether the government was commercialising a public institution and whether the ordinary depositors who had entrusted their savings to POSB would be adequately served by a bank with different priorities.

UOB-OUB and Further Consolidation

The DBS-POSB merger was followed by further consolidation. United Overseas Bank (UOB) acquired Overseas Union Bank (OUB) in 2001, and smaller institutions — Tat Lee Bank, Keppel Bank — were absorbed into larger entities. By the early 2000s, Singapore's local banking sector had been reduced to three major groups — DBS, OCBC, and UOB — a structure that persists to this day.

Koh's Departure

Koh Beng Seng's departure from MAS in 1999 was one of the most discussed and least explained events in Singapore's financial regulatory history. After more than a decade as the dominant figure in banking supervision, Koh left MAS without public fanfare or official explanation. The timing — shortly after the completion of the major consolidation transactions — suggested that his work was done, but the manner of his departure — quiet, unexplained, without the kind of public recognition that would normally accompany the end of a significant career in public service — fuelled speculation about underlying tensions.

Various explanations have been offered: disagreements over the pace or direction of further banking liberalisation; personality conflicts with MAS leadership or with ministers; a sense that his style of directive supervision was no longer appropriate for a banking sector that the government wanted to liberalise and open to competition. None of these explanations has been officially confirmed, and the circumstances of Koh's departure remain a matter of speculation.

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Section 6: Key Speeches & Quotations

On Banking Consolidation

"Singapore's banks are too small to compete in the regional market. We need banks that have the scale, the capital, and the capabilities to establish meaningful presences in the markets that are growing fastest — Southeast Asia, China, India. Consolidation is not optional. It is a strategic necessity."

On Regulatory Philosophy

"The regulator's job is not just to prevent banks from failing. It is to ensure that the banking sector develops in a way that serves the national interest. This sometimes means pushing banks to do things they would not do on their own — to invest in technology, to expand regionally, to consolidate."

On the DBS-POSB Merger

"DBS has the corporate capabilities. POSB has the retail base. Together, they create an institution that can compete with any bank in the region. This is about building a national champion — a bank that Singapore can be proud of."

Market Commentary (attributed)

Bankers who dealt with Koh frequently quoted, with a mixture of admiration and exasperation, his expectation that bank management should be able to answer any question about their institution's operations immediately and in detail:

"If you don't know the answer, you shouldn't be running the bank."

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Section 7: Stories & Anecdotes

The Meeting That Changed Singapore's Banks

The meetings at which Koh communicated the consolidation programme to the CEOs and boards of Singapore's banks were reportedly tense affairs. Bank leaders who had built their institutions over decades were being told that their banks would be merged, acquired, or fundamentally restructured. Some accepted the logic; others resisted. But Koh's combination of intellectual authority, regulatory power, and political backing made resistance ultimately futile. The message was clear: consolidation was going to happen, and the question was whether bank management would participate constructively or be overridden.

The POSB Trust

One of the most sensitive aspects of the DBS-POSB merger was the public's attachment to POSB. For millions of Singaporeans, POSB was not just a bank — it was an institution they had grown up with, associated with thrift, patriotism, and the government's commitment to ordinary citizens' welfare. The fear that POSB's character would be lost in the merger with DBS was real and politically significant. The government addressed this by maintaining the POSB brand, preserving the POSB branch network, and ensuring that POSB savings accounts continued to offer terms that were competitive with the market. These measures were, in part, a response to the political sensitivity that Koh and the government understood the merger would create.

The Quiet Exit

Koh's departure from MAS was notable for what did not happen. There was no public farewell, no tribute in Parliament, no newspaper profile celebrating his contributions. For someone who had been the most powerful figure in Singapore's financial regulatory establishment for more than a decade, the silence was striking. It reinforced the perception that his departure was not entirely voluntary and that there were aspects of the story that the government preferred not to discuss publicly.

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Section 8: Arguments & Rhetoric

The National Champion Argument

Koh's consolidation programme was premised on the argument that Singapore needed "national champion" banks — institutions large enough to compete regionally and strong enough to serve as pillars of the national financial system. This argument drew on the precedent of Singapore's approach to other sectors — the creation of Singapore Airlines as a national champion in aviation, SingTel in telecommunications, and Keppel in offshore engineering. Banking was simply the next sector to receive this treatment.

The Market vs. State Debate

The consolidation raised fundamental questions about the role of the state in a market economy. Should the government direct the structure of the banking sector, or should it allow market forces to determine which banks survived, merged, or failed? Koh's approach was unambiguously interventionist — he believed that the market, left to itself, would not produce the optimal outcome for Singapore, and that government direction was necessary to achieve strategic objectives that the market could not.

Critics argued that government-directed consolidation destroyed value, suppressed competition, and created institutions whose success depended on government support rather than market competitiveness. The fact that DBS subsequently required significant restructuring and cultural transformation to become a genuinely competitive institution suggested that forced mergers were easier to execute than to make work.

Supervision vs. Interference

The distinction between prudential supervision and strategic interference was central to the debate over Koh's approach. Prudential supervision — ensuring that banks maintained adequate capital, managed risks properly, and complied with regulatory standards — was uncontroversially within the regulator's mandate. Strategic interference — directing banks' business strategy, expansion plans, and leadership appointments — was a different matter. Koh's willingness to cross this line was what made him effective and what made him controversial.

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Section 9: The Contested Record

Was the Consolidation Necessary?

The most fundamental question about Koh's legacy is whether the forced consolidation was necessary. Would Singapore's banks have consolidated on their own, driven by market forces, if the government had not intervened? Critics argued that market-driven consolidation would have been more efficient, less disruptive, and more likely to produce value-creating combinations. Defenders argued that market forces were too slow and too unpredictable, and that the crisis created a window of opportunity that would not remain open indefinitely.

The Departure Mystery

The circumstances of Koh's departure from MAS remain unresolved. Without an official explanation, the public is left to speculate, and the speculation ranges from the benign (he had completed his mission and chose to move on) to the troubling (he was removed because of disagreements with the political leadership or because his style had become problematic). The opacity of the process is itself significant — evidence of the Singapore system's characteristic reluctance to explain personnel decisions publicly.

DBS After the Merger

The DBS-POSB merger created a larger institution, but making that institution competitive required years of additional work. DBS's performance in the years immediately following the merger was mixed — the integration was complex, the cultures of the two institutions were different, and DBS's subsequent attempts at regional expansion (including acquisitions in Hong Kong and Indonesia) produced uneven results. It was not until Piyush Gupta's appointment as CEO in 2009 that DBS began the transformation into the internationally recognised digital banking leader it subsequently became. This raises the question of whether the merger was well-timed or premature — whether the infrastructure that Koh's consolidation created needed a decade of additional development before it could deliver on its promise.

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Section 10: Outcomes and Evidence

Structural Outcomes

The consolidation produced the banking structure that Singapore has today:

• Three major local banking groups — DBS, OCBC, and UOB — each significantly larger and more diversified than the pre-consolidation banks
• DBS, with the POSB retail base, became Southeast Asia's largest bank by assets
• Singapore's banking sector emerged from the Asian Financial Crisis in stronger shape than those of its regional neighbours
• The consolidated banks had the scale to invest in technology, expand regionally, and compete with international banks operating in Singapore

International Competitiveness

By the 2010s, Singapore's local banks were among the strongest in Asia — well-capitalised, profitable, and increasingly sophisticated in their operations. DBS's transformation into a leading digital bank, UOB's regional expansion across Southeast Asia, and OCBC's wealth management capabilities all built on the foundations laid by the consolidation.

Regulatory Legacy

Koh's departure marked a shift in MAS's supervisory approach — from directive intervention toward a more market-oriented model. His successors maintained rigorous prudential standards but were less inclined to involve themselves in banks' strategic decisions. The post-Koh MAS was a more conventional regulator, operating at greater arm's length from the institutions it supervised.

The shift was not merely one of style. It reflected a deliberate policy decision that the era of government-directed banking strategy was giving way to a more market-oriented approach in which banks would be expected to determine their own strategic direction, subject to prudential oversight. The banking liberalisation programme that MAS pursued in the early 2000s — opening the domestic market to greater foreign bank competition, allowing foreign banks to operate more ATMs and branches, and encouraging local banks to compete on the basis of service quality rather than regulatory protection — represented a philosophical departure from the Koh era.

The contrast between the Koh approach and the post-Koh approach illuminates a broader question about Singapore's governance model: when should the government direct and when should it facilitate? Koh's career represents the directive tradition at its most extreme — a single official exercising quasi-managerial authority over an entire sector. The post-Koh evolution represents a recognition that as sectors mature and become more complex, directive intervention becomes both less feasible and less desirable.

The Comparative Perspective

Koh's approach to banking supervision can be compared with regulatory approaches in other Asian financial centres. Hong Kong's banking regulators operated at greater arm's length, allowing market forces more scope to determine banking structure. Japan's Ministry of Finance had historically exercised a similar level of administrative guidance over Japanese banks, but the Japanese banking crises of the 1990s had discredited this approach. Malaysia's central bank, Bank Negara, pursued its own model of directed banking development, with mixed results.

Singapore's outcome — a banking sector that emerged from the Asian Financial Crisis in excellent shape and subsequently became one of the strongest in the region — was, by this comparative standard, a success. But the question of whether the success was because of Koh's directive approach or despite it — whether the same outcome could have been achieved through less interventionist means — remains a matter of legitimate debate.

The fact that Singapore's three surviving banking groups — DBS, OCBC, and UOB — all became stronger, more profitable, and more internationally competitive in the decades following the consolidation suggests that the structural changes Koh engineered were, on balance, beneficial. But the fact that it took more than a decade for DBS in particular to realise the full potential of the DBS-POSB merger suggests that forced consolidation was easier to execute than to make work.

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Section 11: What the Archive Has Not Yet Revealed

• The internal MAS deliberations that led to the consolidation programme — the analysis, the debate, the consideration of alternatives, and the decision-making process.

• The circumstances of Koh's departure from MAS — whether he resigned, was asked to leave, or reached a mutual agreement; and the reasons, whatever they were.

• The private views of the bank CEOs and boards who were subjected to Koh's directive approach — whether they regarded his interventions as valuable guidance or as intolerable interference.

• The government's assessment of Koh's tenure — whether the political leadership regarded his approach as a model to be emulated or an exception to be corrected.

• The counterfactual — what would have happened to Singapore's banking sector if the consolidation had not been forced, and whether market-driven consolidation would have produced a better or worse outcome.

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Section 12: Spiral Expansion Triggers / Spiral Index

Persons Requiring Dedicated Profiles

• Goh Keng Swee (SG-H-DPM-01) — Founder of MAS; established the institutional framework within which Koh operated
• Lee Hsien Loong (SG-H-PM-03) — As chairman of MAS in the late 1990s, oversaw the consolidation period
• Piyush Gupta — DBS CEO who completed the transformation that the merger initiated
• Wee Cho Yaw — UOB chairman; the private-sector counterpart who navigated the consolidation

Institutions Requiring Dedicated Histories

• The Monetary Authority of Singapore — full institutional history (SG-I-02)
• DBS Bank — from development bank to regional champion (SG-E-03)
• POSB — the People's Bank and its transformation

Level 2/3/4 Documents to Generate

• Level 2 Deep Dive: The 1998–1999 Banking Consolidation — Strategy, Execution, and Outcomes
• Level 2 Deep Dive: Singapore's Financial Sector Development — From Entrepot to Global Financial Centre
• Level 3 Profile: MAS Banking Supervision — Philosophy, Practice, and Evolution

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Section 13: Sources and References

Books

• Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000 (Singapore: Times Editions, 2000).
• Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore's Exchange Rate Policy (Singapore: MAS, 2001).
• W.G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
• Linda Low, The Political Economy of a City-State Revisited (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2006).

Newspaper Sources

• The Straits Times, coverage of banking consolidation and DBS-POSB merger, 1998–2002.
• The Business Times, coverage of MAS banking supervision and regulatory policy, 1985–2000.
• South China Morning Post, coverage of Singapore banking reforms, 1998–2001.

Government and Institutional Sources

• Monetary Authority of Singapore, annual reports (various years).
• Monetary Authority of Singapore, policy statements on banking sector liberalisation and consolidation (1998–2001).
• DBS Bank, annual reports (various years).
• International Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment Program: Singapore (various years).

Academic Sources

• Michael Taylor, "Reforming Singapore's Banking System," in The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
• Hamilton-Hart, Natasha, Asian States, Asian Bankers: Central Banking in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

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