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SG-H-THINK-01 | Bilahari Kausikan --- Singapore's Realist Conscience: The Intellectual Architecture of Small-State Survival

Document Code: SG-H-THINK-01 Full Title: Bilahari Kausikan --- Singapore's Realist Conscience: The Complete Intellectual Profile of the City-State's Most Combative Strategic Thinker Coverage Period: 1981--2026 Level Designation: Intellectual Profile Version Date: 2026-03-16

Biographical Foundation
Complete Bibliography and Published Works
Core Intellectual Framework: Small-State Realism
The Theory of Relevance: Why Small States Must Never Be Passive
US-China Rivalry: The Rejection of Binary Thinking
China's Influence Operations and the "China Dream" Threat
ASEAN: Centrality, Incoherence, and the Art of the Possible
The Human Rights Debate and the "Asian Values" Project
Critique of Western Liberal Internationalism
Race, Religion, and Social Cohesion in Singapore
Singapore-Malaysia Relations: The Permanent Structural Tension
The Gaza Controversy and Middle East Views
Views on Domestic Politics, Opposition, and Civil Society
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Limits of Chinese Power
Russia-Ukraine War and Its Global Implications
Trump, America's Transformation, and the Post-Cold War Order
The Myth of the Asian Century
Myanmar and the Failure of ASEAN's Moral Posturing
COVID-19: Political Systems and Cultural Instincts
Public Debates and Intellectual Clashes
The WikiLeaks Cables: Private Candour Made Public
Social Media Presence and Controversies
Lee Kuan Yew's Influence and Legacy
Evolution of Thought: From Asian Values Warrior to Global Realist
Influence on Singapore's Foreign Policy Establishment
Awards, Honours, and Institutional Roles
Assessment: The Kausikan Doctrine

1. Biographical Foundation

Origins and Heritage

Bilahari Kim Hee Papanasam Setlur Kausikan was born in 1954 in Singapore. His full name itself encodes the multiracial identity that would become central to his intellectual worldview. His father, P.S. Raman, was a British Raj-born Indian immigrant from Madras (now Chennai) in Tamil Nadu who migrated to Singapore. His mother, Lim Eng Neo, was Peranakan Chinese. This mixed Indian-Chinese heritage --- unusual even in multiracial Singapore --- gave Kausikan a personal stake in the principle of multiracialism that would become one of his fiercest intellectual commitments.

The name "Kausikan" derives from his father's lineage; "Kim Hee" reflects his Chinese Peranakan maternal heritage; "Papanasam Setlur" are Tamil Brahmin indicators of his paternal ancestry. This biographical detail matters because Kausikan would later argue with particular intensity that Singapore's multiracial identity must never be subordinated to any single ethnic affiliation --- whether Chinese, Malay, or Indian --- and that external pressures (from Beijing, from the Arab world, from Western evangelicals) to intensify ethnic or religious identities posed existential threats to the Singapore project.

Education

Kausikan was educated at Raffles Institution, one of Singapore's most prestigious secondary schools and the training ground of much of the city-state's ruling elite. He then studied political science at the University of Singapore (later the National University of Singapore).

After graduation, he received a scholarship from the Public Service Commission to pursue a PhD in international relations at Columbia University in New York. At Columbia, however, Kausikan experienced what he would later describe as a moment of intellectual clarity. While working on his dissertation, he realised two things: first, that he would be a poor academic teacher; and second, that international relations as an academic discipline was, in his characteristically blunt assessment, a "fraud discipline." He abandoned the PhD halfway through his dissertation and returned to Singapore to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This decision --- dropping out of a prestigious doctoral programme at an Ivy League university to become a practitioner rather than a theorist --- would shape his entire intellectual persona. Kausikan would spend decades arguing that the academic study of international relations was largely disconnected from the actual practice of diplomacy, and that think-tank analysis and academic commentary on foreign affairs was populated by people who, as he put it, were "interested in foreign policy" but did not truly "understand it."

"I had a moment of enlightenment... why would I want a PhD when it's just a trade union card for teaching?"

Diplomatic Career: 1981--2013

Kausikan joined the Foreign Service in 1981. He was absorbed into the elite Administrative Service in 1983, aged 29 --- a move he later described with characteristic irreverence:

"The Administrative Service imposed itself on me and several others in the Foreign Service. We were shanghai-ed in against our will."

His career trajectory through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was steady and distinguished:

1981: Joined the Foreign Service
1983: Absorbed into the Administrative Service
1990s: Served in various capacities, including as Deputy Secretary for Southeast Asia
1994: Appointed Singapore's Ambassador to the Russian Federation, with concurrent accreditation as Ambassador to Finland
1995--1998: Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, with concurrent accreditation as High Commissioner to Canada and Ambassador to Mexico
1998: Appointed Deputy Secretary (Foreign Affairs) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2001: Appointed Second Permanent Secretary of MFA
2010: Promoted to Permanent Secretary of MFA (the top civil service position in the ministry)
2013: Retired from the civil service

During his 37 years at MFA, Kausikan served under every phase of Singapore's post-independence foreign policy, absorbing the thinking of the founding generation --- Lee Kuan Yew, S. Rajaratnam, Goh Keng Swee --- and translating it into the institutional culture of the ministry.

Post-Retirement: The Public Intellectual Phase (2013--Present)

Upon retirement in 2013, Kausikan was appointed Ambassador-at-Large, a position he held until May 2018. This role allowed him to continue contributing to Singapore's foreign policy while gradually transitioning into the role of public commentator.

In 2017, he became Chairman of the Middle East Institute (MEI) at the National University of Singapore, a position he held until his retirement from the role in August 2024. He remains associated with MEI as Distinguished Fellow. Under his chairmanship, MEI focused on issues relevant to Singapore's strategic interests, maintaining academic rigour while ensuring its work was accessible to both government stakeholders and the general public.

Since retirement, Kausikan has become one of the most prolific and combative public intellectuals in Singapore's strategic discourse. His Facebook posts, newspaper commentaries, public lectures, and international speaking engagements have made him arguably the most visible articulator of Singapore's strategic worldview --- and certainly the most controversial.

2. Complete Bibliography and Published Works

Books

"Dealing with an Ambiguous World" (IPS-Nathan Lectures, World Scientific, 2016)
- Based on five IPS-Nathan Lectures delivered between January and May 2016 as the S.R. Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore.
- Covers: US-China relations, South China Sea disputes, ASEAN's attempts to maintain order, the role of human rights and democracy in international relations, and what Singapore must do to cope with emerging complexities.
- ISBN: 9789813202009
"Singapore Is Not an Island: Views on Singapore Foreign Policy" (Straits Times Press, 2017)
- A compilation of essays and public speeches spanning 25 years.
- Co-edited with Tan Lian Choo and Eunice Quek.
- Covers: Singapore's foreign policy from independence to 2017, sovereignty of small states, Southeast Asian security architecture, Singapore-Malaysia relations, ASEAN thinking, and the future of the region.
- ISBN: 9789814642972
"China Is Messing with Your Mind" (Epigram Books, Rational Conversations Series, 2019)
- Based on a speech delivered on 12 July 2018 at a forum organised by OCBC Bank.
- 48 pages.
- Focuses on how China uses identity politics and influence operations to shape the attitudes of overseas Chinese communities, with specific implications for Singapore.
- ISBN: 9789814845045
"Singapore Is Still Not an Island: Views on Singapore Foreign Policy" (Straits Times Press, 2023)
- A sequel to the 2017 volume, covering developments through to 2023.
- Co-edited with Tan Lian Choo.
- Covers: US-China rivalry, the myth of a "new Cold War," ASEAN's response to Myanmar, Singapore's strategic positioning, and the need for foreign policy literacy among the Singaporean public.
- ISBN: 9789815081107
"The Myth of the Asian Century" (Lowy Institute Paper, Penguin Special, 2025)
- Published as a Lowy Institute Paper / Penguin Special.
- Challenges the popular notion that the twenty-first century belongs to Asia.
- Argues that the concept is a harmful oversimplification that obscures economic, political, demographic, and security complexities, and is too easily co-opted by China to make its rise seem incontestable.
- ISBN: 9781761357992

Key Academic Articles and Papers

"An East Asian Approach to Human Rights" --- Buffalo Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996. One of the foundational texts of the "Asian Values" debate.
"Asia's Different Standard" --- Media Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1994. An early articulation of the argument that Western definitions of human rights were not universally applicable.
"Governance That Works" --- One of several commentaries published in the early 1990s defending Singapore's governance model against Western liberal critiques.
"The Binary Fallacy: How Not to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia" --- Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No. 11, Spring 2018, pp. 72--89. Published by CIRSD. A systematic critique of binary thinking in East Asian geopolitics.
"Threading the Needle in Southeast Asia: How Biden Can Work with Countries That Can't Afford to Alienate China" --- Foreign Affairs, May 2022.
"Who's Afraid of America First? What Asia Can Teach the World About Adapting to Trump" --- Foreign Affairs, January/February 2025.
"Singapore: Israel in Southeast Asia?" --- in "Beating the Odds Together: 50 Years of Singapore-Israel Ties," World Scientific, 2019.
Contribution to "The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew" --- Brookings Institution publication (co-authored), presenting Lee's foreign policy thinking.
"Myanmar Coup Will Reverberate Far Beyond Southeast Asia" --- Nikkei Asia, 2021.
"Manipulation, Chinese Style" --- Nikkei Asia, 22 August 2018. On China's influence operations in Southeast Asia.
"Was China Duped on Ukraine?" --- Nikkei Asia, 4 March 2022.
"ASEAN Needs to Get Back Its Old Hardheaded Realism" --- Nikkei Asia.

Regular Columns and Media Contributions

Kausikan has been a regular contributor to:

The Straits Times (Singapore's newspaper of record)
Nikkei Asia
South China Morning Post
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
The Washington Post
Firstpost

He began writing pseudonymously for The Straits Times as a student under the name "Bee Kim Hee," a play on his middle name. In his post-retirement phase, his bylined commentaries in The Straits Times have become some of the most widely discussed opinion pieces in Singapore's media landscape.

3. Core Intellectual Framework: Small-State Realism

Bilahari Kausikan's intellectual architecture rests on a single foundational premise: Singapore is a permanent anomaly whose survival depends on never forgetting that it is an anomaly.

This is not merely a diplomatic posture but an existential conviction. An international relations theorist would classify Kausikan as a structural realist, but his realism is distinctive --- it is the realism of a small state that cannot afford the luxury of ideology, sentimentality, or moral posturing, because miscalculation in any of these dimensions could be fatal.

The Anomaly Thesis

Kausikan's starting point is that Singapore should not exist. A Chinese-majority city-state in a Malay-Muslim archipelago, with no natural resources, no strategic depth, and surrounded by much larger neighbours with whom relations have ranged from tense to hostile --- Singapore's continued existence as a sovereign, prosperous, multiracial democracy is, in Kausikan's view, historically improbable.

"The world will probably get along fine without a fully sovereign and independent Singapore."

This is not self-deprecation but strategic clarity. Kausikan argues that Singapore can only survive and prosper by continuing to be an outlier --- by doing things that states its size are not supposed to be able to do. The moment Singapore becomes ordinary, it becomes dispensable.

"Singapore is an anomaly that can remain relevant, survive and prosper only by continuing to be an outlier."

The Primacy of National Interest

From this premise flows everything else. If Singapore's existence is not guaranteed by geography, history, or the goodwill of others, then the only reliable guide to action is a ruthless, unsentimental assessment of national interest.

"Successful foreign policy depends on the ability to make clinical, indeed, cold-blooded and ruthless assessments of interests."

Kausikan applies this principle universally --- to Singapore's relations with the United States, China, its ASEAN neighbours, and the international system as a whole:

"The basis of a good relationship cannot be the expectation that Singapore must subordinate its national interests to the interests of a bigger country merely because it is bigger, whether the bigger country is China, our neighbours or the US."

The Rejection of Passivity

A critical element of Kausikan's framework is his fierce opposition to the idea that small states should be passive, deferential, or "know their place." This is the argument that brought him into his most famous public clash --- with Kishore Mahbubani --- and it reflects his deepest conviction about what made Singapore's founding generation great.

"Independent Singapore would not have survived and prospered if they always behaved like the leaders of a small state."

"Mr Lee and his comrades did not earn respect by being meekly compliant to the major powers. They were not reckless, but they did not hesitate to stand up for their ideals and principles when they had to."

Sovereignty as Daily Practice

For Kausikan, sovereignty is not a legal status conferred by international recognition but a daily practice that must be actively maintained through competence, strategic clarity, and the willingness to absorb costs when core interests are threatened. He draws a direct line between Singapore's domestic governance quality and its ability to maintain sovereignty:

"How the Republic manages this paradox and continues to have a successful foreign policy depends on a sound domestic foundation in politics, policy and social cohesion."

4. The Theory of Relevance: Why Small States Must Never Be Passive

One of Kausikan's most distinctive contributions to strategic thinking is his theory of relevance --- the argument that for a small state, relevance to the international system is not a given but must be actively created and maintained.

"For small states, relevance is not something to be taken for granted. The creation and maintenance of relevance must be the overarching strategic objective of small states."

This argument has several layers:

Relevance Through Competence

Singapore makes itself relevant by being extraordinarily good at things the world needs --- as a financial centre, a logistics hub, a manufacturing base, a diplomatic interlocutor, a neutral venue for sensitive negotiations (such as the 2018 Trump-Kim summit). Kausikan argues that this competence is not accidental but the result of deliberate policy choices and institutional culture.

Relevance Through Strategic Positioning

Singapore positions itself at the intersection of great-power interests without becoming captive to any of them. Kausikan describes Singapore's approach to economic relations with memorable frankness:

"As far as economic relations are concerned, we are completely promiscuous. [We] play with anybody who wants to play with us, as long as there's something in there for us."

And on strategic relationships:

"Always polygamous, never monogamous."

Relevance Through Principle

Paradoxically, Kausikan argues that Singapore's willingness to stand on principle --- even when it is costly --- is itself a source of relevance. A small state that can be pushed around is not worth engaging with; a small state that has clear red lines and the will to enforce them becomes a valued partner.

The Danger of Ordinariness

Kausikan frequently reminds audiences that Singapore cannot afford to be ordinary:

"Singapore must be extraordinary in Southeast Asia. It won't be universally loved."

This willingness to accept unpopularity in exchange for effectiveness is central to Kausikan's worldview. He argues that the desire to be liked is a strategic liability for a small state --- what matters is being respected, and respect comes from competence and reliability, not from agreeableness.

5. US-China Rivalry: The Rejection of Binary Thinking

If there is a single argument that defines Kausikan's post-retirement intellectual output, it is his sustained, forceful rejection of the framing of US-China competition as a "new Cold War" or as a binary choice that countries must make between Washington and Beijing.

"Not a New Cold War"

Kausikan has made this argument repeatedly across multiple platforms --- in Foreign Affairs, Nikkei Asia, CNBC interviews, academic lectures, and on Facebook:

"To call the US-China competition a new Cold War is really intellectually sloppy and lazy."

He argues that the comparison with the US-Soviet Cold War is misleading because it bears only "superficial similarities to the U.S.-Soviet competition of [an] earlier era." The fundamental difference is structural: the US and China are economically interdependent in ways that the US and Soviet Union never were.

"You can't kill off your rival without killing yourself. You can't even hurt your rival without hurting yourself."

Dynamic Multipolarity

Instead of "new Cold War," Kausikan prefers the concept of "dynamic multipolarity" to describe the emerging world order. This formulation captures several key features of his analysis:

Multiple power centres, not just two
Shifting alignments rather than fixed blocs
Economic interdependence coexisting with strategic competition
Regional actors with genuine agency, not mere pawns

The "Binary Fallacy"

In his 2018 Horizons article "The Binary Fallacy," Kausikan systematically dismantles the tendency to view East Asian geopolitics through a binary lens. He identifies three competing "ideas of regional order":

The American idea --- rooted in the post-World War II alliance system
The Chinese idea --- centred on a hierarchical Sinocentric order
The ASEAN idea --- based on the aspirations of Southeast Asia's smaller countries for autonomy and balance

He argues that the binary fallacy "pervades far too much analysis of geopolitical developments in East Asia, whether in the media, academia, or the considerations of some governments."

Singapore's "Omnidirectional" Foreign Policy

Kausikan describes Singapore's approach to the US-China rivalry as "omnidirectional" --- maintaining relationships with both powers while refusing to be captured by either:

"When we say we don't want to choose, it doesn't mean we're going to stay passive, or try to be neutral, or try to be equidistant."

This is a crucial distinction. Kausikan explicitly rejects neutrality and equidistance as strategic options for Singapore. Instead, Singapore's approach is to engage actively with both powers, pursuing its own interests without asking permission from either:

"As far as economic relations are concerned, we are completely promiscuous. [We] play with anybody who wants to play with us, as long as there's something in there for us."

The "Sweet Spot" Illusion

Kausikan warns against the illusion that there is a comfortable middle ground --- a "sweet spot" --- where Singapore can keep both China and the United States happy:

There is no "sweet spot" to keep both the Chinese and Americans "happy." Singapore must accept that its positions will sometimes displease one side or the other, and be prepared to manage the consequences.

The Structural Constraint

Singapore faces a unique structural constraint in navigating the US-China rivalry: it is the only country with a majority Chinese population outside of Greater China. This makes its relationship with Beijing qualitatively different from that of other Southeast Asian states:

Singapore "cannot risk poor relations with Beijing" but also "cannot alienate Washington, given its irreplaceable role as a security guarantor in Southeast Asia."

This dual constraint --- needing both great powers while being vulnerable to pressure from both --- is what makes Singapore's strategic position so delicate and so instructive for other small states.

6. China's Influence Operations and the "China Dream" Threat

Kausikan has been one of the most outspoken voices in Southeast Asia on the subject of Chinese influence operations --- and has paid a price for it, drawing direct rebukes from the Chinese embassy in Singapore and from Chinese diplomats.

The Framework: Persuasion, Inducement, Coercion

Kausikan characterises China's influence operations as deploying a "mix of persuasion, inducement and coercion techniques" designed to "create a psychological environment which poses false choices for other countries." This framework distinguishes Chinese influence operations from straightforward diplomacy or even propaganda:

Persuasion: Presenting China's rise as inevitable and beneficial, and framing resistance as futile
Inducement: Using economic relationships and market access as leverage
Coercion: Punishing countries that cross Beijing's red lines (as in the 2016 Terrex incident)

"China Is Messing with Your Mind"

In his 2018 speech (later published as a book), Kausikan made his most sustained argument about China's psychological influence operations. He warned that China's attempts to craft a narrative of its rise as inevitable constitute a long-term strategy for nurturing influence, deploying "a mix of soft power and identity politics" to "persuade, induce or, in extremis, coerce [the overseas Chinese] into accepting allegiance to China as at least part of their identity."

The Existential Threat to Singapore

Kausikan identifies Chinese influence operations as potentially existential for Singapore because of its majority-Chinese population:

"If too many Chinese Singaporeans are foolish enough to subscribe to Xi's version of the 'China Dream,' the multiracial social cohesion that is the foundation of Singapore's success will be destroyed."

He has described this as "the greatest foreign policy challenge that we face" --- not because China is militarily threatening Singapore, but because the assertion of a Chinese identity among Singaporean Chinese, fuelled by China's rise, could undermine the multiracial compact on which Singapore's domestic stability and regional relationships depend.

The Lianhe Zaobao Problem

Kausikan's concerns have been validated by subsequent investigations. A joint Washington Post / Australian Strategic Policy Institute examination of more than 700 Lianhe Zaobao articles found that Singapore's main Chinese-language newspaper routinely echoed Beijing's most strident falsehoods, including denying evidence of rights abuses in Xinjiang and alleging that protests in Hong Kong and mainland China were instigated by "foreign forces." The paper had been running regular opinion columns since 2016 from at least two CCP officials without noting their party affiliation, referring to them simply as "China affairs commentators."

The Terrex Incident

Kausikan was publicly vocal during the November 2016 Terrex incident, when nine SAF armoured vehicles were seized by Hong Kong customs while in transit from Taiwan. He framed the incident as a deliberate attempt by China to intimidate Singaporeans rather than the Singapore government:

"Open displeasure is meant to intimidate Singaporeans because they have realised that with or without LKY the government cannot be intimidated. They are trying to intimidate Singaporeans in order to get Singaporeans to pressure the government."

China's Response

Kausikan's writings on China have drawn sharp responses from Beijing. In 2020, when he published a piece in The Straits Times about China's political system during the early COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese embassy in Singapore issued a formal response, accusing him of "smearing" China and its Communist Party. The embassy statement said his commentary was "no different from the cliche of Western anti-China voices" and "misinterpreted and smeared China's political and leadership systems."

In 2018, China's ambassador to Singapore Hong Xiaoyong responded publicly to Kausikan's speech on China's "influence operations," stating that his conclusions "cannot be fair and right."

Kausikan has been undeterred by these responses, continuing to publish on the subject with increasing specificity.

Three Foreign Policy Mistakes of Xi's China

In a 2022 Nikkei Asia interview, Kausikan argued that Xi Jinping's China had made three critical foreign policy mistakes:

Miscalculating America's decline
Overplaying its hand in Southeast Asia through aggressive diplomacy
Failing to understand that economic leverage has diminishing returns when overused

7. ASEAN: Centrality, Incoherence, and the Art of the Possible

Kausikan's views on ASEAN are among his most nuanced and, to ASEAN enthusiasts, most uncomfortable. He is neither an ASEAN optimist nor an ASEAN sceptic --- he is what might be called an ASEAN realist, with a clear-eyed assessment of what the grouping can and cannot do.

The Paradox of ASEAN Centrality

Kausikan makes a paradoxical argument about ASEAN centrality: the very things that make ASEAN weak --- its diversity, its consensus-based decision-making, its inability to act decisively --- are also what keep it relevant.

"ASEAN is imperfect but its incoherence sometimes is not a bad thing."

He argues that ASEAN's claims to centrality are "inspired by wishful and sentimental thinking," and that the grouping "indulged in self-belief of being inherently 'central.'" But he also argues that the limitations of ASEAN centrality paradoxically help maintain at least minimal autonomy for its members, preventing any single power from capturing the grouping entirely.

The Art of ASEAN Diplomacy

Kausikan has articulated what might be called the "Goldilocks principle" of ASEAN diplomacy:

"There are things that ASEAN can do very well and we do them, there are things we can only do sub-optimally, and there are things that are simply beyond our powers. And the art of ASEAN diplomacy is to know which is which."

Consensus as Process, Not Outcome

Kausikan offers a characteristically sardonic definition of ASEAN consensus:

"ASEAN's basic consensus is a consensus on always having some sort of consensus even if it is only a consensus on words or on not discussing issues that may break consensus."

This is not entirely a criticism --- Kausikan argues that this process-oriented approach to consensus has its uses. It keeps ASEAN together, prevents ruptures, and maintains a platform for dialogue even when substantive agreement is impossible.

The Expansion Problem

Kausikan argues that ASEAN's expansion in the 1990s to include Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia was done "without adequate socialization of new members," leading to structural problems that have plagued the grouping ever since.

The Cambodia-Laos Problem

In his most controversial statement on ASEAN, Kausikan suggested in a 2020 webinar organised by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute that ASEAN might need to consider expelling Cambodia and Laos if they continued to act as proxies for China:

"They have some difficult choices to make. And if they should make wrong choices, they will confront ASEAN as a whole with difficult choices. We may have to cut loose the two to save the eight."

He described the two Mekong nations as "teetering precariously" towards ceding influence to an outside power --- a thinly-veiled reference to China. He pointed to Cambodia's role in blocking ASEAN's joint communique on the South China Sea in 2012 as evidence of this dynamic.

This statement drew fierce criticism from Cambodia, Laos, and their supporters, with some accusing Kausikan of being an "agent" of outside powers. He dismissed such claims.

The South China Sea

On the South China Sea, Kausikan's position is characteristically realist:

"It is beyond ASEAN's capabilities to resolve the disputes in the South China Sea" since the issue has become "something of a proxy for the contest between the American and Chinese ideas of regionalism."

He draws a historical parallel: "As with the Cambodian issue in the 1980s, this is a big boys' game." The best ASEAN can do is "make our red lines clear to both sides" and play a "limited, but vital role in keeping the peace in the region."

8. The Human Rights Debate and the "Asian Values" Project

Kausikan's role in the "Asian Values" debate of the 1990s is one of the most significant chapters of his intellectual career. He was one of Singapore's primary intellectual combatants in what became a global debate about whether human rights were truly universal or whether Asian societies had legitimate grounds for interpreting and applying them differently.

The Strategic Context

Kausikan has been remarkably candid about the strategic motivations behind the "Asian Values" debate. In a 2014 reflection, he explained that the debate was:

"Only secondarily about values and primarily about politics."

Singapore's goals, he said, were "defensive and modest: to encourage our friends in America and Europe to take a less simplistic view of political development in our region." Once the debate had served this purpose, Singapore was content to set it aside.

This admission is significant because it reveals the instrumentalist approach that Kausikan brings to all intellectual debates --- ideas are tools of statecraft, to be deployed strategically and retired when no longer useful.

The Core Arguments

In his 1994 article "Asia's Different Standard" and his 1996 article "An East Asian Approach to Human Rights," Kausikan made several interconnected arguments:

Against "pretentious universalism": Kausikan argued that the claim of universal human rights masked a Western cultural imperialism that sought to impose particular (Western) definitions of rights on societies with different histories, cultures, and priorities.

Process over outcomes: Kausikan contended that "the Asian approach to human rights is more about process than particular outcomes" --- different societies should be free to determine through their own political processes how rights are balanced against other values such as social order, communal harmony, and economic development.

Western insensitivity: Kausikan charged that the West "seems insensitive to the nuances of different Asian voices and selective in what it chooses to highlight of Asian arguments." This was not merely a policy disagreement but a critique of the intellectual framework through which Western commentators engaged with Asian politics.

US hypocrisy: Kausikan made controversial remarks about US human rights policy, arguing that America's pursuit of human rights had been more "propaganda" than genuine, applicable policy, and that the "universality" of human rights was a myth because differences in perception, ideology, approach, and practical implementation showed there was no single way of interpreting human rights across different nations.

The "Singapore School"

Kausikan, along with other Singaporean intellectuals and politicians (notably Kishore Mahbubani, who would later become his adversary), became identified with what commentators called the "Singapore School" of Asian values. This school argued that:

Good governance could take forms other than Western liberal democracy
Economic development and social order might legitimately take priority over individual civil and political rights in developing societies
Asian societies had their own traditions of political philosophy that should be taken seriously rather than dismissed as authoritarian apologetics

Evolution of the Argument

The Asian financial crisis of 1997--98 was widely seen as discrediting the "Asian Values" argument, since the governance failures it exposed suggested that the "Asian model" had its own serious deficiencies. Kausikan's response has been characteristically pragmatic: rather than defending the original formulation, he has reframed the argument in terms that avoid the now-discredited "Asian Values" label while maintaining the core substance.

His later formulations focus on:

Rejecting the idea that political systems determine governance outcomes
Arguing that "culture" rather than political structure explains why some societies handle crises better than others
Insisting that Singapore's success vindicates a governance model that does not fit neatly into Western categories

9. Critique of Western Liberal Internationalism

Kausikan's critique of the "liberal international order" is one of his most developed intellectual positions, articulated across multiple publications and speeches.

The Order That "Wasn't So Liberal"

Kausikan challenges the foundational premise of the liberal international order:

"The liberal international order wasn't so liberal to those who were not in agreement with it."

He argues that this order "was never uncontested" and that the assumption of consensus is historically false:

"There is no world order that has ever commanded consensus, total consensus or even substantial consensus."

Post-Cold War Hubris

Kausikan traces the origins of the current debate to the end of the Cold War, which generated a "hubris that infected American and, more generally, Western foreign policies during the early 1990s." This hubris stemmed from viewing the end of the Cold War "as the very denouement of History itself" --- an obvious reference to Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis, which Kausikan treats with barely concealed contempt.

During this period, "the United States and its allies in Europe claimed universality for their particular definitions of human rights and values." Kausikan argues that this was not merely intellectual overreach but an active policy of coercion dressed up as principle.

Asian Ambivalence

Kausikan observes that:

"Much of Asia views the liberal order with ambivalence."

He points out that when Asian countries invoke a "rules-based order," the term "tends to carry significantly different meanings than it does in the West." For many Asian states, "rules-based order" means sovereignty and non-interference --- not the liberal interventionism that Western governments often have in mind.

Trump as Symptom, Not Cause

One of Kausikan's most incisive arguments is that the current stress on the liberal international order predates and transcends Donald Trump:

"If the 'liberal international order' is under stress, Trump is a symptom not a cause. The pressures on the 'liberal international order' have deeper roots than Donald Trump."

This argument allows Kausikan to maintain his critique of Western liberal internationalism while also maintaining a working relationship with the United States --- he can acknowledge the disruption that Trump represents without treating it as an aberration that will be reversed once a different president takes office.

International Law as a Tool, Not a Framework

In one of his most provocative formulations, Kausikan has argued:

"International law is only a tool of diplomacy and is not the only tool or one that is fit for every purpose."

This puts him directly at odds with legal internationalists like Tommy Koh, who treat international law as a framework that constrains and shapes state behaviour. For Kausikan, law is instrumental --- useful when it serves the national interest, but not a substitute for power or strategy.

Kausikan's views on race, religion, and social cohesion reflect both his personal background (as a person of mixed Indian-Chinese heritage) and his strategic conviction that Singapore's multiracial identity is not merely a social good but a strategic necessity.

In a July 2019 panel discussion, Kausikan identified three main forces that could challenge Singapore's social cohesion:

The Arabisation of Islam: The trend towards a more austere, Middle Eastern-influenced form of Islam, displacing the traditionally syncretic, Southeast Asian forms of Islamic practice that have characterised Singapore's Malay-Muslim community.
Assertive Chinese identity fuelled by China's rise: The temptation for Chinese Singaporeans to identify with the "China Dream" narrative promoted by Xi Jinping's government, which could undermine their identification with a multiracial Singapore.
The rise of evangelical Christianity: Kausikan noted that evangelical Christianity is "probably the fastest growing religion in Singapore" and raised concerns about its tendency towards cultural imperialism. He gave an example of one of his researchers receiving threats from "an evangelical Christian group" over something written about the Middle East.

The Danger of "Authentic" Identities

Kausikan ties these three threats together through a common theme: external claims of cultural or religious "authenticity" that position Singapore's local forms of identity as inauthentic or deficient:

"The danger to Singapore comes from notions that the Arab form of Islam, the Chinese identity, and the western political identity are much more authentic than the ones already in place in Singapore."

Singapore's Uniqueness in the Region

Kausikan emphasises that Singapore is unique in Southeast Asia for organising itself "horizontally on the basis of multiracial meritocracy" rather than on the vertical, ethnically hierarchical basis that characterises most of its neighbours (where a dominant ethnic group holds political primacy). This makes Singapore both admirable and vulnerable --- admirable because it has achieved something rare, and vulnerable because it is surrounded by states organised on fundamentally different principles.

11. Singapore-Malaysia Relations: The Permanent Structural Tension

Kausikan's views on Singapore-Malaysia relations are characterised by a structural realism that sees tension as a permanent feature of the relationship rather than a problem to be solved.

The Cyclical Pattern

Kausikan identifies a recurring pattern in which domestic political dynamics in Malaysia periodically generate friction with Singapore:

The bilateral issues are "not new issues; they are very old issues... this is the fourth iteration."

He argues that "when politics within Malaysia get incoherent, Singapore becomes a useful 'rallying point' for Malaysian leaders to rally their Malay ground and be 'tough' against."

The "Bogeyman" Function

Kausikan has described how political uncertainty in Malaysia leads to "Singapore being used as a bogeyman to hold things together" for its northern neighbour. This analysis --- treating Singapore-Malaysia friction as a function of Malaysian domestic politics rather than genuine bilateral disputes --- has not always been well received in Kuala Lumpur.

Mahathir and the Structural Problem

On Mahathir Mohamad's return to power, Kausikan warned that "a strengthened Mahathir will press Singapore on old bilateral issues" and cautioned against placing "too much emphasis" on Mahathir as an individual, since the underlying dynamics were structural.

Cooperation Despite Tension

Despite his unsentimental analysis, Kausikan maintains that cooperation is both possible and necessary:

"We can cooperate with our neighbours, should cooperate, and in fact must cooperate" --- while simultaneously safeguarding and advancing national interests.

He has also shared Lee Kuan Yew's famous assessment, posting an old video of LKY saying: "We've got friendly neighbours? Grow up." This captures Kausikan's view that realism about the neighbourhood is a precondition for effective management of bilateral relationships.

12. The Gaza Controversy and Middle East Views

As Chairman of the Middle East Institute, Kausikan waded into the Israel-Gaza debate in November 2023 with an op-ed in The Straits Times titled "Hard truths about Gaza war's cruel and complex dilemmas." The piece generated significant controversy and exposed fault lines between Kausikan's realist worldview and both Singapore's legal establishment and its Muslim community.

The Op-Ed and Its Arguments

Kausikan condemned Hamas's October 7 attack as "unacceptable" but adopted a framework that critics saw as too sympathetic to Israel's military response. He wrote that humanitarian law and the laws of war "take on a somewhat abstract quality as counsels of perfection" in the heat of combat, and suggested that Israel "will respect humanitarian law and the laws of war to the extent that it is practical."

Shanmugam's Public Correction

In a significant public intervention, Singapore's Minister for Law K. Shanmugam pointed out that Kausikan's op-ed did not "emphasise the illegal actions by the Israeli government over many years" and did not address "the severe restrictions that had been imposed on the population of Gaza, in effect denying any hope to the Palestinians."

This was a rare instance of a sitting cabinet minister publicly correcting a former senior diplomat, and it indicated that Kausikan's position was outside the consensus of the Singapore government on this issue.

Tommy Koh's Disagreement

Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh also publicly disagreed with two of Kausikan's points:

That humanitarian law takes on "a somewhat abstract quality as counsels of perfection"
That Israel "will respect humanitarian law and the laws of war to the extent that it is practical"

Kausikan responded by framing the differences as "between the idealist and the realist," positioning himself, as always, on the realist side:

"International law is only a tool of diplomacy and is not the only tool or one that is fit for every purpose."

Later Position (2025)

In May 2025, Kausikan acknowledged that Israel had been "very careless about collateral damage" but resisted the characterisation of Israel's actions as genocide, arguing that genocide means "a deliberate attempt to eradicate a whole population" and that he did not believe this was occurring.

13. Views on Domestic Politics, Opposition, and Civil Society

Kausikan's views on Singapore's domestic politics are less developed than his foreign policy positions but are consistent with his overall framework: he is deeply suspicious of any development that might weaken Singapore's strategic coherence, whether from the political opposition, civil society, or what he sees as the importation of foreign political templates.

The Workers' Party and Foreign Policy

In his 2016 IPS-Nathan Lecture, Kausikan accused the Workers' Party of playing "fast and loose with foreign policy for partisan purposes." The specific trigger was a parliamentary question asked in 2013 by a Workers' Party MP about Singapore's decision to abstain on a UN General Assembly resolution to elevate Palestine's status.

Kausikan posed three rhetorical questions:

If the Arab countries did not think Singapore's relations with Israel and its position on Palestine were problems, why was the Workers' Party raising the issue?
Was the Workers' Party trying to stir Singapore's Malay-Muslim population against the government?
Would Singapore benefit if Singaporean Muslims became alienated from the government or non-Muslim Singaporeans?

These questions were widely seen as imputing bad faith to the opposition on a sensitive issue, and they drew a response from academics and commentators who argued that Kausikan was attempting to delegitimise parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy.

He identified "the first signs of failure by some to resist the temptation to use foreign policy as a tool of partisan politics" --- a warning that foreign policy should remain above partisan politics and be conducted with bipartisan consensus, a position consistent with his view that Singapore's smallness and vulnerability make internal division on strategic issues dangerous.

The Lee Hsien Yang Controversy

During Singapore's 2020 general election, Kausikan waded into the controversy surrounding Lee Hsien Yang (younger son of Lee Kuan Yew) and his association with the political opposition. In a Facebook post published on Cooling Off Day, Kausikan attacked Lee Hsien Yang for urging voters to support the opposition, accusing him of "trying to cause trouble without responsibility" and calling this "cowardly."

In the same post, Kausikan erroneously suggested that Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had sold the Oxley Road house to his brother for a single dollar --- a factual error, since Lee Hsien Yang had paid market price and subsequently donated an additional 50% of the sale price to charity.

When criticised for the error, Kausikan acknowledged his mistake but justified it by saying he was "too upset over the sheer hypocrisy" and that his "larger point remains valid."

This episode drew censure from Dr Lee Wei Ling (Lee Kuan Yew's daughter) and led to broader public criticism of Kausikan for what was perceived as taking sides in the Lee family dispute. Ambassador Tommy Koh publicly questioned why Kausikan had "such venom" against Lee Hsien Yang. Kausikan eventually apologised to Lee Wei Ling for his comments.

Critique of Vivian Balakrishnan

In a notable instance of criticising a serving minister, Kausikan called Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan's comments in a Bloomberg interview "unhistorical nonsense and profoundly misleading." Balakrishnan had referred to the ending of a "peace dividend" that came after World War II, which had allowed countries to cut defence spending and focus on social welfare. Kausikan responded:

"This is unhistorical nonsense and profoundly misleading --- after WWII, there were such things as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, several wars in the Middle East, numerous wars in the Third World many of which were Cold War proxy wars and huge defence expenditures by the two camps."

He argued that if there ever was a peace dividend, it was for "a very brief post-Cold War period" --- not the decades following World War II that Balakrishnan had implied. This willingness to publicly correct serving ministers demonstrates both Kausikan's intellectual independence and his combative temperament.

On Civil Society

Kausikan has generally been sceptical of civil society activism, particularly when it draws on Western frameworks or is perceived as importing foreign political templates into Singapore. He views many civil society demands through a security lens, asking not whether they are morally justified but whether they would weaken Singapore's strategic coherence or social cohesion.

14. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Limits of Chinese Power

Hong Kong

Kausikan's commentary on the 2019 Hong Kong protests was characteristically blunt. In a July 2019 piece published in the South China Morning Post, he argued:

"I do not know when the demonstrations will end. But I am quite certain about what they will achieve: Absolutely nothing!"

He described the violent protesters as "morons" and argued that Hong Kong had "lost that battle before it even began" because Beijing would never compromise on national unity.

While acknowledging the "disquiet" of Hong Kongers confronted with the growing control of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping, Kausikan argued that calling for democracy was futile and misdirected:

"What Hong Kong really needs is not more democracy but better governance. Good governance requires political representation, but the terms are not synonyms."

This argument reflects Kausikan's broader conviction that good governance and democracy are related but not identical concepts, and that the conflation of the two is a Western analytical error.

Taiwan

Kausikan has made several significant observations about Taiwan:

On reunification, he is unequivocal:

"Why would the Taiwanese want to voluntarily reunify?" The prospect of Taiwan joining China is "nil."

"There's no support for the two extremes of unilateral independence or reunification. Most people want the status quo to remain and I think the status quo can be maintained."

On Taiwanese identity, he notes that it "is growing much stronger" --- a trend that makes Beijing's reunification narrative increasingly disconnected from reality.

Kausikan has also argued that Xi Jinping "won't survive a failed war with Taiwan," suggesting that the risks of a military adventure are so high that rational calculation should deter Beijing, though he does not rule out the possibility of miscalculation.

Singapore's Military Relationship with Taiwan

Singapore's military training relationship with Taiwan (Project Starlight), dating back to 1975, has been a persistent irritant in Singapore-China relations. The 2016 Terrex incident brought this issue into sharp focus. Kausikan has defended Singapore's right to maintain this relationship while acknowledging the need to manage its implications carefully.

15. Russia-Ukraine War and Its Global Implications

Kausikan's analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war has been characteristically realist, focusing on structural outcomes rather than moral judgements.

Singapore's Position: Self-Interest as Principle

Kausikan framed Singapore's decision to impose sanctions on Russia not as an "anti-Russian" gesture but as a defence of Singapore's own existential interests:

"In defending the principle of sovereignty, the only side Singapore is taking is our own."

Singapore's sanctions are "not anti-Russian" but "anti-Putin" --- and more fundamentally, they reflect the principle that "big countries should not try to subjugate small countries by force." For Singapore, a city-state surrounded by much larger neighbours, this principle is not abstract but existential.

The Paradox of Putin's Achievements

Kausikan makes the ironic observation that Putin has achieved what decades of American diplomacy failed to:

"Putin has succeeded where all post-Cold War American presidents have failed by getting Europeans to take their own defence seriously; overnight Germany doubled its defence budget and overcame its long-standing taboo on transfers of weapons."

Predictions on the Conflict

Kausikan predicted that the Ukraine conflict would drag on into "a frozen conflict that could last decades." He observed that "without external intervention, the ultimate outcome is not in doubt; the Ukrainians are fighting heroically, but the sheer mass of the Russian offensive will overwhelm them in a grinding and bloody war with heavy casualties on both sides."

China's Dilemma

On China's position, Kausikan noted that Beijing was in "damage control mode" after Russia's invasion and was attempting to shift the narrative "from the fact of invasion, to the unreliability of NATO."

Nuclear Proliferation Risk

Kausikan warned that the Ukraine conflict raised the prospect of more states going nuclear:

"The lesson... many countries have drawn is that if you give up your nuclear weapons, you will be invaded."

16. Trump, America's Transformation, and the Post-Cold War Order

Trump as "Fundamental Shift"

Kausikan argues that Trump's second term represents not a temporary aberration but "a fundamental shift in how America engages the world." Critically, he frames this as larger than Trump the individual:

"Trump represents something much larger, a fundamental shift in how America engages the world."

He characterises Trump as "the first truly post-Cold War American president" --- arguing that every president from Clinton through Biden maintained Cold War-era assumptions about America's role, even as the structural conditions that supported those assumptions eroded.

America as "Offshore Balancer"

Kausikan envisions America becoming an "offshore balancer" for the rest of the world --- including Europe --- rather than the direct defender it has been since World War II. This shift is not retreat but recalibration:

"We'll all have to get used to a different America. It's not an American retreat, but it will be America that is much more transactional. There's going to be America that's going to demand more of not just its allies, but its partners and its friends."

The Domestic Roots of American Retrenchment

Kausikan contextualises Trump's foreign policy within a longer trajectory of American domestic prioritisation:

Every post-Cold War president from Clinton through Obama and Biden had domestic priorities as their main focus. Biden's "Build Back Better" differed from Trump's "Make America Great Again" only in tone.

Asia's Comparative Advantage

In his January 2025 Foreign Affairs article "Who's Afraid of America First?", Kausikan argues that while European countries view Trump's return as "almost apocalyptic," Asian countries are better equipped to adapt because they have never had the luxury of relying on American protection in the same way Europeans have.

Tariffs and Economic Disruption

On Trump's tariffs, Kausikan has been characteristically sober:

"I can't find a single economist, except perhaps those working in the second Trump administration, who thinks that tariffs will have a very positive effect on American growth in the long term."

He dismissed Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim's proposal for ASEAN to negotiate tariffs collectively as impractical, noting that the US "prefers to deal with countries bilaterally because that's where your leverage is," with Trump being "an extreme example of this approach."

Trump's First Term: Not All Bad

Kausikan's assessment of Trump's first term was characteristically unsentimental:

"The Trump administration wasn't all bad. The world did not end. And some of the things Trump did to restore the credibility of American hard power were certainly in our interest."

17. The Myth of the Asian Century

In his 2025 Lowy Institute Paper / Penguin Special, Kausikan makes a sustained case against the popular narrative that the twenty-first century belongs to Asia.

Core Thesis

The notion of an "Asian Century" "obscures more than it reveals," concealing many economic, political, demographic, and security complexities. No single continent can define the future.

China's Appropriation

Kausikan argues that the term "Asian Century" is "too easily co-opted by China to make its rise seem incontestable, as if scepticism about China's ambitions is tantamount to swimming against the tide of history." The concept is often appropriated by Beijing and fed to people who "are not familiar with Asian history or interested in international affairs."

Strategic Dangers

Framing the era as an "Asian Century" risks "entrenching zero-sum thinking and exacerbating strategic tensions between the United States and China."

The US Will Remain

Kausikan contends that "the United States will remain a decisive presence in the region" and that "Asia is comfortable with, and well suited to, multipolarity." The century ahead will be shaped by "a dynamic interplay of regional and global forces that defies easy characterization."

18. Myanmar and the Failure of ASEAN's Moral Posturing

Kausikan's critique of ASEAN's response to the February 2021 Myanmar coup is among his most scathing and sustained arguments.

The Five-Point Consensus: "A Ridiculous Deal"

Kausikan called the ASEAN five-point consensus on Myanmar "totally unrealistic" and described it as:

"Aspirational and performative --- a posture rather than a policy."

More bluntly:

"A ridiculous deal from the minute it was signed."

The Fundamental Error

Kausikan argues that it was a strategic mistake for ASEAN to suspend the State Administration Council (SAC) until it complied with the five-point consensus. His reasoning is brutally simple: if the Tatmadaw were an organisation willing to exercise restraint, it would not have staged a coup in the first place. ASEAN has neither effective carrots nor sticks to influence the Tatmadaw's behaviour and "can only try to influence it by talking to it." By refusing to engage the real power in Myanmar until conditions are met, ASEAN's ability to influence events has become "practically non-existent."

The Irony of Mimicking Western Failure

Kausikan identifies a bitter irony: from 1988 to the early 2000s, ASEAN criticised the West for adopting an inflexible ideological approach to Myanmar. ASEAN has now adopted that same failed policy --- "striking a grand posture with no effective plan."

The Core Lesson

"ASEAN's mishandling of the Myanmar issue underscores the dangers of soft-headed or sentimental thinking and confusing feeling good for actually doing good."

This formulation captures one of Kausikan's deepest convictions: that moral posturing is not merely ineffective but actively harmful, because it substitutes emotional satisfaction for strategic action.

The Tatmadaw as Central Reality

In a 2021 interview, Kausikan stated bluntly:

"The Tatmadaw is a central reality that must be part of any solution."

He criticised Western approaches to Myanmar:

"The West approached Myanmar through a misplaced sense of moral superiority rather than strategic calculation."

And cautioned that governments must "muster political courage to be patient."

19. COVID-19: Political Systems and Cultural Instincts

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kausikan made arguments that were consistent with his broader intellectual framework: rejecting ideological explanations in favour of cultural and institutional ones.

Systems Don't Determine Outcomes

Political systems do not determine countries' success at handling COVID-19.

Kausikan pointed out that Taiwan (a liberal democracy), Vietnam (a single-party state), Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei (all with different political systems) had all handled the pandemic effectively. The common factor was not political structure but cultural instincts --- what he called "different cultural and political instincts and habits."

China's Leninist Dilemma

Kausikan described China's pandemic response as a consequence of its Leninist value system, where "a vanguard party has absolute control of state and society." This system had advantages (the political will to lock down Hubei province and build hospitals rapidly) and disadvantages (reluctance among lower officials to sound the alarm as the virus spread).

He identified this as reflecting the CCP's "fundamental dilemma of how to strike a balance between political control and economic efficiency."

Culture Over Structure

The broader lesson Kausikan draws from the pandemic is that:

"It is not necessarily a question of having a superior system, but rather that of different cultural and political instincts and habits."

This is a refinement of the old "Asian Values" argument, stripped of its ideological packaging and reframed in more defensible empirical terms.

20. Public Debates and Intellectual Clashes

The Kishore Mahbubani Clash (2017)

The most famous of Kausikan's public disputes was with Kishore Mahbubani, then Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at NUS, in July 2017.

The trigger: Kishore published a commentary in The Straits Times on 1 July 2017 arguing that Qatar's diplomatic isolation by its Gulf neighbours held lessons for Singapore. His first lesson was: "Small states must always behave like small states."

Kausikan's response was explosive. In a Facebook post that was shared by Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam, Kausikan called Kishore's argument "muddled, mendacious and indeed dangerous."

"I am profoundly disappointed that Kishore should advocate subordination as a norm of Singapore foreign policy."

"Independent Singapore would not have survived and prospered if they always behaved like the leaders of a small state as Kishore advocates."

Kausikan argued that Kishore's position --- that small states should be deferential to large ones --- was not just wrong but dangerous, because it would undermine the very posture that had allowed Singapore to survive and thrive.

The dispute revealed a fundamental intellectual divide between two schools of Singaporean strategic thought:

The Kausikan school: Small states must be assertive, principled, and willing to absorb costs for standing their ground
The Mahbubani school: Small states must be pragmatic, flexible, and avoid unnecessarily antagonising great powers

The fact that Shanmugam publicly shared and praised Kausikan's response was widely interpreted as the Singapore government endorsing Kausikan's position over Mahbubani's.

The Tommy Koh Dialogues

Kausikan's relationship with Tommy Koh --- Singapore's other great elder diplomat --- has been more nuanced, characterised by mutual respect combined with genuine intellectual disagreement.

Kausikan has explicitly framed their differences:

"The differences between him and Koh are between the idealist and the realist."

And more specifically:

"Prof Koh is an inveterate idealist who focuses on words, while I am an inveterate realist who focuses on the harsh eternal verities of international relations."

Their disagreements have surfaced on multiple occasions:

Gaza (2023): Koh publicly disagreed with Kausikan's framing of humanitarian law as "abstract" in the context of the Gaza war.
Lee Hsien Yang (2020): Koh questioned why Kausikan had "such venom" against Lee Hsien Yang.
On xenophobia (2020): They agreed that a Lianhe Zaobao forum letter criticising migrant workers was xenophobic --- one of their rare public agreements.

The "Idealist vs. Realist" Framing

Kausikan has been remarkably self-aware about his intellectual temperament:

"We would also be in trouble, but perhaps just a little less, if all our diplomats were like me."

This acknowledges that his combative, realist approach to diplomacy has its limitations --- that diplomacy also requires the idealism, patience, and relationship-building skills that figures like Tommy Koh exemplify. But the concession is characteristically backhanded: the world would be "in trouble" either way, but "perhaps just a little less" with people like him.

21. The WikiLeaks Cables: Private Candour Made Public

The 2010 WikiLeaks cable release exposed Kausikan's private diplomatic assessments, revealing the unvarnished candour that characterises his approach to analysis --- assessments that, when made public, caused considerable diplomatic embarrassment.

The Cables' Contents

The cables detailed meetings between senior US officials and Singapore's foreign affairs chiefs --- Peter Ho, Bilahari Kausikan, and Tommy Koh --- during 2008 and 2009. Kausikan's assessments were characteristically blunt:

On Malaysia: Kausikan criticised Malaysia's "lack of competent leadership" and connected then-Prime Minister Najib Razak to a 2006 murder scandal. He told US officials that Singapore perceived "a distinct possibility of racial conflict in Malaysia."

On Thailand: He dismissed former PM Thaksin Shinawatra as "corrupt, just like everyone else, including the opposition." He claimed Thaksin paid off the gambling debts of the Thai crown prince, whom he described as "very erratic, and easily subject to influence."

On Myanmar: He suggested that China and India were "more concerned with stability than justice" and feared the Burmese junta's demise could produce "an Asian reprise of the breakup of Yugoslavia."

On North Korea and Iran: He said he was "more comfortable with a nuclear-capable North Korea than a nuclear-capable Iran."

On Russia: He disparaged Russia's economy as "Third World," with an inferior health system and facing "insurmountable demographic challenges."

The Fallout

These revelations confirmed what many had long suspected about Singapore's diplomatic style: that behind the polished public facade of ASEAN solidarity and neighbourly friendship, Singapore's diplomats maintained ruthlessly realistic assessments of their neighbours and the wider region. The cables also demonstrated that Kausikan's public persona --- blunt, analytical, unsentimental --- was not a post-retirement affectation but a deeply ingrained professional habit.

Kausikan has been one of Singapore's most active senior public figures on Facebook, using the platform to share political commentary, engage in debates, and --- not infrequently --- to attack positions and individuals he disagrees with.

Kausikan's Facebook posts are notable for their:

Directness: He writes as he speaks --- bluntly, without diplomatic hedging
Willingness to name names: Unlike many former officials who maintain studied neutrality, Kausikan directly criticises individuals by name
Speed: He often responds to events within hours, sometimes before official government statements
Occasional errors: His speed and passion have sometimes led to factual mistakes, as in the Oxley Road incident

Notable Controversies

The Oxley Road error (2020): On Cooling Off Day during the 2020 general election, Kausikan published a Facebook post attacking Lee Hsien Yang and erroneously claiming that the Oxley Road house was sold for one dollar. He later apologised for the factual error but maintained his broader argument.

The Malaysia "bogeyman" comment (2018): Kausikan wrote that political uncertainty in Malaysia had led to "Singapore being used as a bogeyman to hold things together." Malaysian netizens responded with intense criticism, and senior members of the Malaysian ruling party called him a "washout."

Hong Kong protesters as "morons" (2019): His description of violent Hong Kong protesters as "morons" was widely shared and debated.

Self-Awareness About His Style

Kausikan has acknowledged his provocative style with a degree of self-awareness:

"We are direct. We are frank. And I think it's something to do with the fact that we are all immigrants who left much of our traditional cultures behind. All our ancestors came from somewhere else --- a bit like Americans in a sense."

23. Lee Kuan Yew's Influence and Legacy

Kausikan's intellectual formation was profoundly shaped by his decades of working under Lee Kuan Yew and the founding generation. He has spoken about this influence with a rare reverence that contrasts with his usual acerbic tone.

Personal Impressions

When asked who made the biggest impression on him during his career, Kausikan stated:

"I felt in the presence of greatness at least with Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, and Rajaratnam."

He described his early career as working "in humble capacities as note-takers and bag carriers," but emphasised that he was "privileged to absorb almost by osmosis something of the values and basic principles that guided [Lee's] actions."

Lee as Realist

Kausikan characterises Lee Kuan Yew as fundamentally a realist:

"An international relations theorist would call Mr Lee a realist."

The Enduring Framework

Kausikan argues that the core principles Lee established "still form the basis of Singapore's foreign policy, although their application is continually adjusted to changing circumstances." The key qualities Lee instilled are:

"Supple, pragmatic, disciplined and unsentimental long-term thinking focused on the national interest."

The Impermanence of Human Achievement

In his tribute following Lee's death in March 2015, Kausikan struck a characteristically unsentimental note:

"What was created by human endeavour must be maintained by human endeavour."

This captures Kausikan's rejection of complacency --- the conviction that Singapore's achievements are not permanent but must be actively defended in every generation.

24. Evolution of Thought: From Asian Values Warrior to Global Realist

Kausikan's intellectual evolution over four decades can be traced through several distinct phases:

Phase 1: The Young Diplomat (1981--1993)

During this period, Kausikan was absorbing the worldview of Singapore's founding generation while developing his own voice. He was building the institutional knowledge and regional expertise that would later inform his public commentary.

Phase 2: The Asian Values Combatant (1993--1998)

This was Kausikan's most ideologically committed period. As the author of "Asia's Different Standard" and "An East Asian Approach to Human Rights," he was the intellectual point man for Singapore's challenge to Western universalism. His arguments were sharp, politically motivated, and strategically deployed.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997--98 effectively ended this phase, discrediting the broader "Asian Values" framework even as many of Kausikan's specific arguments about cultural difference remained defensible.

Phase 3: The Senior Diplomat (1998--2013)

As Deputy Secretary, Second Permanent Secretary, and then Permanent Secretary, Kausikan became responsible for the institutional management of Singapore's foreign policy rather than its public articulation. This period shaped his understanding of the gap between theoretical arguments and practical statecraft.

Phase 4: The Public Realist (2013--Present)

Since retirement, Kausikan has evolved into something rare in Singapore: an independent public intellectual with genuine institutional credibility, willing to argue with serving ministers, foreign governments, and popular opinion simultaneously.

His intellectual framework has become less ideological and more structural over time. The early "Asian Values" arguments have been replaced by a more sophisticated realism that is less concerned with defending any particular political system and more focused on identifying structural constraints and opportunities.

Key evolutionary markers:

From defending Asian governance to arguing that governance quality is independent of political systems
From challenging Western universalism to challenging all forms of ideological thinking (including Chinese narratives)
From Singapore-centric analysis to a broader framework of small-state strategy applicable globally
From private candour to public commentary, becoming increasingly willing to say in public what he once said only in classified cables

25. Influence on Singapore's Foreign Policy Establishment

Institutional Culture

Kausikan's influence on Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs extends beyond specific policy positions to the ministry's institutional culture. He has championed what he calls a "scholar-blind" culture:

"I don't care if people are scholars or not. I discriminate between people who can do their work and people who can't."

This emphasis on performance over credentials (in a civil service that has traditionally privileged academic qualifications) reflects his own experience of dropping out of a PhD programme and thriving in a practitioner environment.

The Diplomat as Potter

Kausikan has used a distinctive metaphor for diplomacy:

He "likens diplomats to potters" --- craftsmen who work with raw material (international circumstances) to shape outcomes, rather than theorists who impose abstract frameworks on reality.

Foreign Policy Literacy

In his post-retirement phase, Kausikan has been a persistent advocate for greater "foreign policy literacy" among the Singaporean public. He argued at NUS in 2019 about the "importance of educating the public on foreign policy" to prevent oversimplified narratives from hindering Singapore's diplomatic flexibility.

He has warned that "the number of people interested in foreign policy greatly outnumber those who understand it well" --- and that this gap creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited by foreign actors and domestic populists alike.

The "Red Lines" Concept

Kausikan has strongly advocated for Singapore to establish clear "red lines" --- uncrossable boundaries which, if violated, trigger known consequences --- and to ensure the state has both the means and political will to enforce these red lines. This concept has been applied to:

China's influence operations
Threats to multiracial social cohesion
Challenges to Singapore's sovereignty from neighbours
External attempts to shape Singapore's domestic politics

Study of International Relations as "Fraud Discipline"

Kausikan has maintained throughout his career that the academic study of international relations is a "fraud discipline," disconnected from the actual practice of diplomacy. This has made him a controversial figure in academic circles but has also given him credibility among practitioners who share his scepticism of theoretical frameworks.

26. Awards, Honours, and Institutional Roles

Singapore Government Awards

Public Administration Medal (Gold), 2001 --- for contributions as Administrative Officer and Second Permanent Secretary at MFA
Pingat Jasa Gemilang (Meritorious Service Medal), 2012 --- for outstanding leadership and service to Singapore's Foreign Service

International Awards

Order of Bernardo O'Higgins (Gran Cruz), December 2002 --- conferred by Chilean President Ricardo Lagos
Oman Civil Merit Order (Second Class), February 2013 --- awarded by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman

Academic Recognition

NUS Outstanding Service Award, 2024 --- for leadership of the Middle East Institute and commitment to academic and institutional excellence

Institutional Affiliations

Chairman, Middle East Institute, NUS (2017--2024); Distinguished Fellow (2024--present)
S.R. Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 2015/16
Member, Advisory Council, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London
Member, The Trilateral Commission
Associate, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Fellow, National Security College, Australian National University

27. Assessment: The Kausikan Doctrine

The Intellectual Architecture

Bilahari Kausikan has, over four decades, constructed the most comprehensive intellectual architecture for Singapore's strategic positioning of any figure in the post-founding generation. His framework can be summarised in several interlocking propositions:

The Anomaly Principle: Singapore is a historical anomaly whose survival requires continuous active maintenance, not passive reliance on goodwill or historical momentum.
The Relevance Imperative: Small states must actively create and maintain their relevance to the international system; relevance is never guaranteed.
The Anti-Binary Principle: The world is characterised by dynamic multipolarity, not binary competition. Attempts to impose binary frameworks (democracy vs. authoritarianism, US vs. China) are intellectually lazy and strategically dangerous.
The Omnidirectional Principle: Singapore should engage with all partners without exclusive attachment to any. "Always polygamous, never monogamous."
The Domestic Foundation Principle: Effective foreign policy requires sound domestic governance, social cohesion, and political stability. These domestic foundations are as important as diplomatic skill.
The Identity Security Principle: External attempts to reshape Singapore's racial, religious, or cultural identities --- whether from China, the Arab world, or Western sources --- pose existential threats that must be actively countered.
The Instrumentalist Principle: Ideas, international law, and institutional frameworks are tools of statecraft, not ends in themselves. They should be deployed when useful and set aside when not.
The Anti-Sentimentality Principle: Foreign policy must be conducted with "clinical, cold-blooded and ruthless assessments of interests." Sentiment, ideology, and moral posturing are not merely useless but actively harmful.

Criticisms of Kausikan

Kausikan's intellectual framework is not without critics, and several recurring criticisms deserve note:

Excessive realism: Critics argue that Kausikan's relentless focus on interests and power underestimates the role that norms, institutions, and international law play in constraining state behaviour and protecting small states.

PAP apologetics: Some commentators have argued that Kausikan's dismissal of opposition politics and civil society serves to legitimise one-party dominance rather than reflecting genuine strategic analysis.

Selective application of principles: Critics note that Kausikan applies his anti-binary, anti-ideological framework selectively --- he is quick to criticise Western ideological overreach but slower to criticise Singapore's own use of ideology in governance.

ASEAN realism as fatalism: Sebastian Strangio and others have argued that Kausikan's "ASEAN realism" risks becoming a counsel of despair that accepts institutional weakness rather than seeking to address it.

Insensitivity on humanitarian issues: His framing of humanitarian law as "abstract" in the Gaza context, and his description of Hong Kong protesters as "morons," have been criticised as reflecting a moral blindness inherent in excessive realism.

The Enduring Contribution

Despite these criticisms, Kausikan's contribution to Singapore's strategic discourse is unmatched in his generation. He has given Singapore --- and small states more broadly --- a vocabulary and a framework for thinking about survival in a world of great-power competition. His willingness to say unpopular things, to argue with allies and adversaries alike, and to maintain intellectual independence from both government and opposition has made him the closest thing Singapore has to a genuine public intellectual in the field of foreign policy.

His self-description remains perhaps the most accurate assessment:

"I say what I think."

Sources and Further Reading

Books by Bilahari Kausikan

Dealing with an Ambiguous World (World Scientific, 2016)
Singapore Is Not an Island: Views on Singapore Foreign Policy (Straits Times Press, 2017)
China Is Messing with Your Mind (Epigram Books, 2019)
Singapore Is Still Not an Island (Straits Times Press, 2023)
The Myth of the Asian Century (Penguin/Lowy Institute, 2025)

Key Articles

"An East Asian Approach to Human Rights," Buffalo Journal of International Law (1996)
"The Binary Fallacy," Horizons Journal (2018)
"Threading the Needle in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs (2022)
"Who's Afraid of America First?," Foreign Affairs (2025)
"Manipulation, Chinese Style," Nikkei Asia (2018)

Interviews and Profiles

James Crabtree, "Holding Court," Mekong Review (November 2022--January 2023)
Max Raskin interview, maxraskin.com
"I Say What I Think," PSD Challenge
National Press Foundation transcript (June 25, 2025)
Columbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute, "Agency Is Always There" (2025)
Shanmugam-Kausikan Dialogue, MEI Annual Conference 2023

Selected Media Coverage

Document compiled for the Singapore Governance Corpus. This intellectual profile draws on publicly available sources including published books, academic articles, news reports, interviews, public lectures, and social media posts. All quotations are attributed to their original sources as identified through research.

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